Ted Banks Comments on Antitrust Division’s Guidelines on Compliance Programs
The DOJ's Antitrust Compliance Guidelines: Shame on You if You Were Surprised -- Now Use Them!
For many years the DOJ took the position that its primary tool to encourage compliance with the antitrust laws was its amnesty/leniency program, whereby the first party to voluntarily reveal that it has committed an antitrust violation may qualify for complete amnesty from criminal prosecution. Everyone else was out of luck, no matter what kind of compliance program they had. Under this approach, the fact that there was an antitrust violation proved (at least as far as the Antitrust Division was concerned) that it was a “failed” compliance program, not deserving of any sort of credit. Over the years, numerous efforts were made to get them to change their position, and there were indications that the Division was warming-up to the notion that encouraging antitrust compliance programs was a good thing, particularly as other parts of the Justice Department increased their emphasis on the value of compliance programs. In April 2018, the Division held a public Roundtable on Criminal Antitrust Compliance, where Assistant Attorney General Makan Delrahim stated that corporate compliance was the key to the Division’s ultimate goals of preventing and uncovering criminal antitrust violations and protecting consumer and small businesses. It definitely looked like the Antitrust Division approach to compliance programs was changing.
On July 11, 2019, the Antitrust Division announced the release of Evaluation of Corporate Compliance Programs in Criminal Antitrust Investigations. These guidelines brought the Antitrust Division in line with the approach to compliance programs outlined in United States Sentencing Guidelines and the rest of the Department of Justice by adopting a policy that compliance efforts can be considered at both the charging and sentencing stage counted to mitigate a sentence recommendation. It reviewed the language from the FSG regarding compliance, and incorporated guidance from the Justice Manual and the compliance guidance provided by the International Chamber of Commerce and OECD.
But what was most notable about the guidelines was that there was nothing in the content that should have surprised any compliance professional. Even under the Division’s prior policy, you should have been doing these things all along. If you weren’t, that’s unfortunate, but now it is time to ramp-up your efforts.
What can also be done now (unless, of course, you have no gaps in your existing program) is to take these guidelines to your board of directors and identify a plan to satisfy them. This, of course, could/should have been done when the FSG for organizations were first issued many years ago, or when other guidance from the DOJ was issued more recently, but now there is further emphasis on what the government expects to see. And, it goes without saying, a prudent company would do these things to reduce the odds of violating the law and not just to please the DOJ.
The Guidelines start out with a very general overview. They quote the Justice Manual’s approach to looking at a compliance program to influence a charging decision. The Justice Manual asks three fundamental questions:
- Is the corporation’s compliance program well designed?
- Is the program being applied earnestly and in good faith?
- Does the corporation’s compliance program work?
While these questions certainly go to the bona-fides of a compliance program, they really don’t give a compliance officer (or a prosecutor) a lot of guidance. The Division’s prosecutors would ask three more high-level questions about the efficacy of a compliance program:
- Does the company’s compliance program address and prohibit criminal antitrust violations?
- Did the antitrust compliance program detect and facilitate prompt reporting of the violation?
- To what extent was a company’s senior management involved in the violation?
So, the Guidelines then go on to outline how they would review the effectiveness of an antitrust compliance program by examining the following factors:
- the design and comprehensiveness of the program;
- the culture of compliance within the company;
- responsibility for, and resources dedicated to, antitrust compliance;
- antitrust risk assessment techniques;
- compliance training and communication to employees;
- monitoring and auditing techniques, including continued review, evaluation, and revision of the antitrust compliance program;
- reporting mechanisms;
- compliance incentives and discipline; and
- remediation methods.
For each of these nine aspects, the Division asks a series of questions to test whether there is an effective compliance program. One way to approach the use of these questions in evaluating (and improving) your compliance program would be to put all the questions into a simple 2-column form. The left-hand column would have the questions from the guidelines and the right-hand column would identify the aspect of your program satisfies that requirement, whether through manual or automated controls. The existence of empty right-hand boxes should speak volumes to a board member who is concerned about protecting the company with an effective compliance program, as well as protecting his or her own hide from a Caremark-type lawsuit.
In discussing how these principles will be applied to influence a sentencing recommendation, the Division notes that the Sentencing Guidelines provide several ways to receive credit for an effective compliance program. It also notes that no credit would be given where that has been an unreasonable delay in reporting the illegal conduct to the government. There is a rebuttable presumption that a compliance program is not effective when certain “high-level personnel” or “substantial authority personnel” “participated in, condoned, or [were] willfully ignorant of the offense.” This presumption may be rebutted if (i) individuals with operational responsibility for the compliance program had direct reporting obligations to the governing authority of the company (e.g., an audit committee of the Board of Directors if applicable); (ii) the compliance program detected the antitrust violation before discovery outside of the company or before such discovery was reasonably likely; (iii) the company promptly reported the violation to the Antitrust Division; and, (iv) no individual with operational responsibility for the compliance program “participated in, condoned, or was willfully ignorant” of the antitrust violation.
The Division does not normally recommend probation for companies that cooperate with the investigation and accept responsibility, but may do so in certain circumstances, such as when a company did not put an adequate compliance program in place. Probation, periodic compliance reports, and the appointment of a monitor may be required to oversee implementation of an effective compliance program and timely reports.
Extraordinary post-violation compliance efforts may warrant a fine reduction. Division prosecutors would consider activities related to the activities of senior management to bolster the “tone at the top” in support of compliance), improvements to a pre-existing compliance program, creation of a robust compliance program, and implementation of disciplinary procedures for employees who violate the law or the company’s compliance program.
The grid that follows this summary is one way such a form might be presented. The firm is happy to provide assistance on upgrading your antitrust compliance program – or any area of your compliance program.
Questions to Review as Provided by the Antitrust Division's Evaluation of Corporate Compliance Programs in Criminal Antitrust Investigations.
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For more information, Mr. Banks can be reached at 312-662-4897 or email: [email protected].